Privacy risks from iOS photo metadata

There’s a ton of very personal information associated with a photo that you take with your smartphone. By default, the phone captures all of the camera settings (aperture, shutter speed, focal length). But it also captures location and timestamp. The timestamp and location from a photo, or series of photos, can be used by a domestic violence perpetrator to infer places a victim frequents, and their patterns of travel. When this information is posted via a photo sharing service or social media account, it can be an unexpected (and even unknown, silent) privacy breach. 

A Twitter conversation the other night prompted this post. A very senior graphics engineer was surprised to see how much of her personal information and travel patterns was exposed to a stalker ex-partner via photo sharing. The location history revealed by someone’s photo stream is at least as rich (and endangering) as the direct location history determined from GPS. That’s a dangerous privacy breach. If it caught a senior engineer by surprise, imagine how many non-technical smartphone customers are at risk!

All of this photo reference information is commonly referred to as metadata, but that’s an imprecise technical buzzword. Properly written messaging and photo sharing apps will educate the customer about what’s being captured, shared, and posted. “It’s not just the photo, but we’re going to tell the world where you were and when you were there. And once we post it, that information will be available forever, and indexed by all of your favorite search engines.” Many apps won’t be quite that honest. And many customers won’t pay attention. If they do pay attention, they might not remember, years later, that they had given permission, when domestic violence becomes a possibility or reality.

Apple can help this by making an iOS app’s photo sharing permissions more granular.

At the moment, there are three levels of permission for access to the camera and the camera roll. They are defined in Cocoa Keys. They are: NSPhotoLibraryAddUsageDescription (write-only access to the photo library);  NSCameraUsageDescription (direct capture of the camera image); and NSPhotoLibraryUsageDescription (full read-write access to the photo library’s images and metadata).

An additional level of granularity, call it NSPhotoLibraryImagesUsageDescription, would help. This proposed new setting would allow an app to read the images in the photo library. It would not allow photo editing, metadata editing, or metadata viewing. If a customer grants NSPhotoLibraryImagesUsageDescription access to an app, that app cannot (deliberately or inadvertently) share the customer’s position history via photos. The privacy fence would be enforced by the operating system. And that’s exactly what we want an operating system to do.

I’ve filed this as rdar://33421676 with Apple. Dupe freely!

I have no idea what the analogous answer for Android is. Drop me a note if you know, and I’ll update this post.

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Vote stealing, or just clunky machines?

The Charleston Gazette reports some cases of votes being changed from Democratic to Republican while the voters watched! The election officials interviewed blamed the user, saying that the voters were trying to go through the ballot too quickly. One official said that it was only a few voters out of 400–so I guess that means that West Virginia voting officials think that a 1% error is acceptable.

Sequoia Voting Machines: stop mistrusting us or we’ll sue

Interesting Email from Sequoia: “[voting machine maker] Sequoia has also retained counsel to stop any infringement of our intellectual properties, including any non-compliant analysis. “

(Via Freedom to Tinker (Ed Felten/Alex Alderman).)

I guess the standard license agreement does not permit customers to ask smart people to ask too many questions about their product.